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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Clinton Haggard appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision that
affirmed his conviction, following a court trial, for misdemeanor domestic battery. On appeal,
Haggard argues that he did not waive his right to a jury trial because the trial court did not
personally address the waiver with him.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Haggard with misdemeanor domestic battery in the presence of a child.
(R., p.6.) At 7:00 a.m. on June 8, 2016, Haggard filled out a “Notification of Rights” form,
initialing eight items, including item #4, which reads:
Should you plead “not guilty”, you have the right to a trial before the Court or a
jury of six (6) jurors drawn from the Court Jury Panel. You may bring witnesses
or evidence to the trial on your behalf and you will have the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses testifying against you.
(R., p.20.) Haggard’s signature and a handwritten date and time are on the bottom of the form.
(Id.)

According to the Court Minutes of Haggard’s arraignment that same morning, he was

“advised of his[] rights; charge(s) and possible penalties[,]” and “stated that he[] understands and
will request the public defender.” (R., p.21.)
Haggard also signed a form entitled “Statement of Defendant’s Rights: Domestic Assault
or Battery Cases.” (R., p.23 (emphasis original).) The form advised Haggard that, if he pled not
guilty, “the court will ask you whether you wish to have a trial before a jury or a trial before a
judge only, and will set a trial date.” (Id.) Haggard entered a plea of “not guilty.” (R., p.21.) A
public defender was appointed to represent Haggard. (R., p.22.)
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At the pre-trial conference, Haggard, his trial counsel, and the prosecutor, all signed a
“Pretrial Stipulation and Order,” which had a box that was checked stating that the case was set
for a court trial and “the right to have this matter heard by jury trial is waived by both parties.”
(R., p.27.) At a bench trial, the magistrate court convicted Haggard of misdemeanor domestic
battery. (R., pp.33-34.) The court sentenced Haggard to 90 days jail, with 88 days suspended, and
placed him on probation for two years. (R., p.43.) At no point through his sentencing hearing did
Haggard or his trial counsel request a jury trial. (See generally R., pp.1-44; Tr., pp.5-116.)
Haggard appealed to the district court (R., pp.45-48), and after the submission of briefs (R.,
pp.60-78, 86-94), and oral argument (Tr., pp.122-165), the court entered a Decision and Order on
Appeal, affirming Haggard’s conviction (R., pp.97-111). Haggard filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp.112-115, 120-127.)
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ISSUE
Haggard states the issue on appeal as:
1. Is it reversible error for Appellant’s conviction to have been entered where the
Appellant was never personally addressed by the magistrate court regarding his
waiver of jury trial?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Haggard failed to meet his burden of showing that either the law or the record support
his claim of fundamental error in relation to the waiver of his right to a jury trial?
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ARGUMENT
Haggard Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Showing That Either The Law Or The Record
Support His Claim Of Fundamental Error In Relation To The Waiver Of His Right To A Jury
Trial
A.

Introduction
Haggard argues that the district court erred by holding that he failed to establish

fundamental error on his claim that, because he was “never personally addressed by the magistrate
court regarding his waiver of jury trial[,]” such waiver was invalid. (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)
Haggard contends the failure to obtain a personal waiver represents fundamental, structural error
that can be considered on appeal despite trial counsel’s failure to object to having a court trial.
(See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-13.) Haggard’s argument fails. Because the record supports
a finding that Haggard was aware of his right to a jury trial, and because the law did not clearly
hold that a written jury trial waiver signed by a defendant does not constitute an express or personal
waiver, Haggard cannot meet his burden of showing fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity,

the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.” State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho
709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d
758 (2008)). The appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the
magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.” Id. “If those findings are so supported
and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision,
[the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure.” Id. (citing
Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).
4

Errors raised for the first time on appeal are subject to review under the fundamental error standard.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

C.

Haggard Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The District Court’s Alleged Failure
To Obtain A Personal Waiver Of Haggard’s Right To A Jury Trial
Haggard contends the district court erred by concluding that he failed to demonstrate

fundamental error based on his assertion that his written jury trial waiver was not valid. Haggard
specifically argues that, because his written waiver of his right to a misdemeanor jury trial was not
entered in “open court,” he did not “personally” waive such right. (Appellant’s Brief, p.13
(“[W]hen a defendant waives a jury trial, the court must address personally with the defendant.
The magistrate’s failure to do so in this case constitutes a structural defect and is reversible
error.”).)
Because Haggard did not preserve his constitutional claim in the magistrate court, he has
the burden of showing that the error he claims is fundamental. State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,
265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010) (unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it
“constitutes fundamental error”).

In order to establish fundamental error, Haggard must

demonstrate that the alleged error: “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3)
was not harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
The right to a jury trial is one of constitutional magnitude in that it is expressly provided
for in both the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Idaho Const. art. I, § 7 (“The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”). However, it is also beyond dispute that the right to
a jury trial can be waived. State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 101, 753 P.2d 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1988)
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(“[T]he right to a jury trial is not jurisdictional; it can be waived.”); Idaho Const. art. I, § 7 (“A
trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open
court.”). Because Haggard waived his right to a jury trial, his claim of error fails under the first
prong of the fundamental error test because he cannot show a violation of an unwaived
constitutional right. Haggard nevertheless contends he can meet his burden in this regard because
the record does not show that he made a personal, on the record (“expressed in open court”), waiver
of his right to a jury trial, and, therefore, his waiver was invalid. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-13.)
Haggard’s argument fails.
The district court’s Decision and Order on Appeal, attached as Appendix A, is incorporated
by this reference and relied upon by the state to show that Haggard has failed to demonstrate
fundamental error in regard to the validity of his written waiver of his right to a jury trial. In
addition to the district court’s legal and factual analysis, the state makes the following
supplemental arguments.
In its role of intermediate appellate court, the district court noted that Haggard failed to
provide it with the transcript of his arraignment proceeding, and concluded that, without the
transcript, “this Court must rely upon the Court Minutes, which state that Haggard was advised of
his rights in open court.” (R., p.109; see id., p.110 (“the silence of the record with regard to his
arraignment colloquy works to Haggard’s detriment, not the State’s.”).) Haggard has attempted
to augment the appellate record by belatedly filing a “supplemental transcript” of the June 8, 2016
arraignment proceeding. (See 7/23/18 Motion to Augment Record; 8/17/18 Notice of Reporter’s
Supplemental Transcript Filed.) However, because that transcript was not presented to the district
court at the intermediate level of appeal, it should not be considered by this Court because the
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appellate court is “limited to review of the record made below[.]” 1 State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho
374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993); see Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292,
293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980) (missing portions of the record are presumed to support the action
of the trial court); Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[I]t is
not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence.”).
Idaho Criminal Rule 23(b) states:
Misdemeanor Cases. In criminal cases not amounting to a felony, issues of fact
must be tried by a jury, unless a trial by jury is waived by the consent of both parties
expressed in open court and entered in the minutes.
(Emphasis added).

The record shows that both parties (Haggard, his trial counsel, and the

prosecutor) consented to waive a jury trial by signing the Pretrial Stipulation and Order, and that
the written waiver was entered in the minutes. (See R., p.27.)
Whether the pretrial conference proceeding constituted “open court” is another matter. The
district court took notice of the procedure “typically utilized at the magistrate court level for
pretrial conferences” in Bingham County: “an informal conference between the prosecutor, the
defendant, and defense counsel, after which a pretrial stipulation and order is signed by the parties
and the presiding magistrate judge.” (R., p.109.) Such an “informal conference” has been deemed
by at least one Idaho appellate decision to not constitute “open court.” Goodwin v. State, 138
Idaho 269, 274, 61 P.3d 626, 631 (Ct. App. 2002) (“As the district court stated at the hearing on
the state’s motion to dismiss after remand, pretrial conferences are not open court proceedings but
are informal conferences with the court and counsel present.”) (emphasis added)).

1

Even if the transcript is considered, it shows that the magistrate acknowledged that Haggard had
filled out his rights form (which included his jury trial rights). (Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.15-16; see R.,
p.20.) When the magistrate asked him if he had any questions about his rights, Haggard answered,
“No, sir.” (Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.15-17.)
7

Therefore, the relevant question becomes whether I.C.R. 23(b)’s three requirements must
all be met in order for a misdemeanor jury trial waiver to be deemed constitutionally valid.
Although State v. Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557, 416 P.3d 108 (2018), held that the jury trial waiver
procedure set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) for felonies must be followed in order for such
waiver to be valid under Article 1, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, 2 there has been no similar
decision in regard to Rule 23(b) pertaining to misdemeanors. Therefore, it cannot be “clear on the
record” that non-compliance with Rule 23(b) creates a constitutional violation under the second
prong of Perry.

2

In Vasquez, the Court considered the validity of a jury trial waiver in a felony case in which
Vasquez was present with her counsel in court, but only her counsel said that Vasquez stipulated
to waive a jury trial, and the district court “never inquired of her whether or not she personally
agreed with this stipulation.” Id. at 559, 416 P.3d at 110. The Court held that Vasquez’s failure
to “personally waive” her right to a jury trial was a clear violation of her constitutional right to a
jury trial. Id. at 561-562, 416 P.3d at 112-113. The Court also gave the failure to follow I.C.R.
23(a) constitutional significance, stating:
The second prong or “clear error” requirement of Perry is also met because the
procedure followed by the trial court contravened Idaho Criminal Rule 23(a) in this
case. The Rule provides: “In felony cases issues of fact must be tried by a jury,
unless a trial by jury is waived by a written waiver executed by the defendant in
open court with the consent of the prosecutor expressed in open court and entered
in the minutes.
Here, the trial court did not discuss with Vasquez her right to a trial by jury, nor did
Vasquez offer any indication that she waived her right in a knowing, voluntary
manner. The trial court’s failure to follow this requirement establishes a clear
violation of Vasquez’s constitutional right to trial by jury.
Id., 163 Idaho at 562, 416 P.3d at 113; see State v. Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 510, 376 P.3d 707,
714 (2016) (J. Burdick dissenting) (“[A]lthough the Idaho Constitution does not explicitly require
a defendant to personally waive the right to a jury trial, this Court has promulgated a Rule requiring
such a personal waiver in felony cases. The Constitution contemplates that the manner in which
the right to a jury trial is waived may be prescribed by law, which is precisely what Idaho Criminal
Rule 23(a) does. Thus, in felony cases, I would hold that a defendant must personally waive the
right to a jury trial for that waiver to be constitutionally valid.”).
8

As discussed (see n.2, supra.), in Vasquez, the Idaho Supreme Court focused on whether
Vasquez personally waived her right to a jury trial, stating, “Vasquez’s failure to personally waive
her right to jury trial is a clear violation of a constitutional right.” 163 Idaho at 561, 416 P.3d at
112. The Court specifically held that, although Vasquez was present in court with her attorney,
because only her attorney expressly agreed that Vasquez stipulated to waive her right to a jury
trial, Vasquez did not personally do so; therefore, her waiver was not valid under Article 1, § 7 of
the Idaho Constitution and fundamental error was established. Vasquez, 163 Idaho at 560-564,
416 P.3d at 111-115. The most obvious difference between Vasquez and the facts here is that
Haggard personally signed the Pretrial Stipulation and Order which had a box checked setting the
case for a court trial and stated, “the right to have his matter heard by jury trial is waived by both
parties.” (R., p.27.) Unlike Ms. Vasquez, Haggard “personally” waived his right to a jury trial by
signing a written waiver.
Finally, as to whether a written felony waiver under I.C.R. 23(a) must also be signed or
acknowledged by a defendant in open court, the Vasquez opinion can be read in two ways – making
it unclear. Vasquez appears to endorse language from State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 703 P.2d 727
(Ct. App. 1985), that either a written jury trial waiver from a defendant, or a defendant’s waiver
of a jury trial expressly made in open court suffices: 3
This Court has similarly recognized that “[t]he right to a jury trial is a fundamental
right and must be guarded jealously.” [State v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d
952, 957 (1986).] See also Swan, 108 Idaho at 966, 703 P.2d at 730 (a defendant
may not waive the fundamental right to trial by jury unless such waiver is made
personally by the defendant, either in writing, or in open court).

3

The Vasquez decision stated the issue on appeal as, “Vasquez argues that she did not expressly
waive her right to a jury trial under Article 1, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, either in writing
or in open court.” Vasquez, 163 Idaho at 561, 416 P.3d at 112 (emphasis added).
9

Based on these statements of the law, is axiomatic that the failure to obtain a
defendant’s personal, knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to jury trial is a
clear violation of a constitutional right, thus satisfying the first prong of Perry.”
Vasquez, 163 Idaho at 562, 416 P.3d at 113 (emphasis and full citation added); cf. id., 163 Idaho
at 564, 416 P.3d at 115 (“For the reasons set forth above, we hold that failure to obtain a personal
waiver of jury trial from the defendant, either orally or in writing in open court is a structural
defect, which constitutes fundamental error.”). In light of the differing statements in Vasquez in
regard to whether a written jury trial waiver in felony cases must be made in open court, there is
no authority supporting Haggard’s argument that a signed jury trial waiver in a misdemeanor case
must be made or acknowledged in open court. 4

4

Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule (“M.C.R.”)14(a) and (b) combine with M.C.R. 13 to allow
defendants who have been charged with certain misdemeanors “by a uniform citation or
complaint” to “sign a written plea of guilty on the citation and pay the fine and court costs” without
ever appearing in court before a judge or magistrate. The misdemeanors include a host of offenses
having required bail bond amounts not exceeding certain listed amounts. M.C.R. 13, 14(b).
M.C.R. 14 says nothing about a defendant’s right to a jury trial. However, for defendants entering
written guilty pleas to misdemeanors by writing on their uniform citation, they are advised that
they “are entitled to a trial by jury if requested[.]” See https://isc.idaho.gov.imcr5 (under (g), press
“Click here for form” and page 16 (sequential)). In short, a person charged with certain
misdemeanor offenses can mail a citation to the court with a signed guilty plea provision without
being advised in person of his or her right to a jury trial. In contrast, Haggard contends that his
right to a jury trial was violated even though he attended a pretrial conference where he signed a
stipulated jury trial waiver that was filed with the court – after being advised of his jury trial rights
on more than one occasion. It would be incongruous to allow the out-of-court procedure set forth
in M.C.R. 14 for a defendant entering a guilty plea to a misdemeanor (impliedly waiving his/her
jury trial right), but require a defendant who signs a jury trial waiver at a pretrial conference to
hale a magistrate into court in order to have the defendant expressly acknowledge such waiver.
10

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Haggard’s conviction for
misdemeanor domestic battery.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2019.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of January, 2019, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
TREVOR L. CASTLETON
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
trevorcastleton@yahoo.com

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
JCM/dd
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APPENDIX A

-

-

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
CLINTON HAGGARD,
Defendant/Appellant.

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2016-4416

DECISION AND ORDER ON
APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Clinton Haggard (hereinafter "Haggard") appeals his misdemeanor
Domestic Battery conviction on the ground that he was denied his constitutional right to a
jury trial. 1 Respondent the state of Idaho (hereinafter the "State") opposes Haggard's
claim.2
Haggard's appeal was heard on June 29, 2017. 3 On August 4, 2017, this Court
met with the parties to alert them that a potentially dispositive issue had not been

1 Appellant's Brief, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed May 8, 2017)
(hereinafter "Haggard's Brier'), at p. l.
2 Respondent's Brief, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed June 2, 2017)
(hereinafter the "State's Brief").
3 Minute Entry Oral Argument on Appeal, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416
(filed June 29, 2017).
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briefed. 4 The parties were given additional time to brief the new issue, if desired. 5 The
State elected to file additional briefing, therefore the case was stayed to allow time for the
parties' to submit supplemental briefs. 6 The case was resubmitted as of September 8,
2017. 7

Based upon the arguments of the parties, the record, and the relevant authorities,
Haggard's appeal shall be dismissed.

II.

ISSUE

Haggard argues that he did not waive his right to a jury trial in front of the
presiding magistrate judge as required by Idaho law. 8 Haggard did not raise this issue
before Magistrate Judge Barrett prior to or during his Court Trial. 9 Neither did he raise
the issue to Judge Barrett prior to 10 or at sentencing.11
Thus, the sole issue before the Court 1s this: Has Haggard demonstrated
fundamental error at the Magistrate Court level?

Minute Entry, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed August 4, 2017)
(hereinafter the "August 4 Minute Entry"); Order Staying Appeal, State v. Haggard, Bingham County
case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed August 7, 2017) (hereinafter the "Stay Order").
5 August 4 Minute Entry.
6 Stay Order.
7 Order Reopening Appeal, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed September
12,2017).
8 Notice of Appeal, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed January 20, 2017).
9 See: Court Minutes, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed September 7,
2016) (hereinafter the "Court Trial Minute Entry").
10 See: Court Minutes, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed November 16,
2016) (hereinafter the "November 16 Minute Entry"); Court Minutes, State v. Haggard, Bingham County
case no. CR-2016-44 I 6 (filed December 7, 2016) (hereinafter the "December 7 Minute Entry").
11 Court Minutes, 5,tate v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed December 15, 2016)
(hereinafter the "Sentencing Minute Entry").
4
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III.
1.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On June 8, 2016, at 7:00 o'clock a.m., Haggard, who was housed in the

Bingham County Jail, initialed and signed a Notification of Rights form. 12 The Rights
Form included the following item, under Paragraph 4:
Should you plead "not guilty", you have the right to a trial before the
Court or a jury of six (6) jurors drawn from the Court Jury Panel. You
may bring witnesses or evidence to the trial on your behalf and you will
have the opgortunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying
against you. 3
2.

The Rights Form directed Haggard to initial only those enumerated items

which he fully understood. 14 Haggard initialed Paragraph 4, cited above. 15
3.

On the same day, beginning at 9: 17 a.m., Haggard appeared before Judge

Barrett for arraignment. 16 He pleaded not guilty to the State's charge and requested
appointment of a public defender to represent him. 17 According to the June 8, 2016
Court Minutes, Haggard was advised of his rights. 18
4.

Again on June 8, 2016, Haggard signed a statement of rights for domestic

assault or battery cases. 19 In that statement, the following explanation was made:
NOT GUILTY PLEA. If you plead NOT GUILTY, the court will ask
you whether you wish to have a trial before a jury or a trial before a judge
only, and will set a trial date. 20
Haggard signed and dated the statement, under the following:

12 Notification of Rights, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed June 8, 2016)
(hereinafter the "Rights Form").
13 Rights Form, at 'If 4.
14 Rights Form, immediately preceding the enumerated items.
15 Rights Form, at 'If 4.
16 Court Minutes, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed June 8, 2016)
(hereinafter the "June 8, 2016 Court Minutes").
17 Id.
is Id.
19 Statement of Defendant's Rights: Domestic Assault or Battery Cases, State v. Haggard, Bingham County
case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed June 8, 2016) (hereinafter the "Statement of Rights in Domestic Cases").
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I HA VE READ THIS DOCUMENT OR HAD IT EXPLAINED TO ME
AND HA VE RECEIVED A COPY. 21
5.

A Notice of Pretrial Conference was filed on June 8, 2016. 22 The Notice

of Pretrial Conference set the date of the pretrial in Haggard's case and required Haggard

to appear. 23 It is signed by Haggard. 24
6.

On July 12, 2016, Haggard signed a Pretrial Stipulation and Order. 25 Of

several boxes on the Pretrial Stipulation and Order, the box with a checkmark states:
COURT TRIAL is set for _l_ day of Sept , 20JQ_ at 1:15 P.M.
AND the right to have this matter heard by jury trial is waived by
both parties26
The Pretrial Stipulation and Order is also signed by Haggard's attorney and the Bingham
County Prosecutor, Cleve B. Colson. 27
7.

On the same date, the Court issued a Notice of Hearing setting Haggard' s

case for a Court Trial. 28 The Notice of Hearing was sent to Haggard and to his attorney. 29
8.

On September 7, 2016, Haggard appeared before Judge Barrett for a Court

Trial. 30 His attorney was also present.31 Both the State and Haggard called witnesses. 32
9.

At no time before, during, or after the trial did Haggard object to

proceeding before the Bench rather than a jury or ask for a jury to hear the case. 33 Judge

ld., at p. 1, ,i 10.
Jg., at p. 2.
22 Notice of Pretrial Conference, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed June 8,
2016) (hereinafter the "Notice of Pretrial Conference").
23 Id.
20

21

24

Id.

Pretrial Stipulation and Order, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed July 12,
2016) (hereinafter the "Pretrial Stipulation and Order").
26 Pretrial Stipulation and Order, (emphasis in original).
27 Pretrial Stipulation and Order.
28 Notice of Hearing, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed July 12, 2016).
29 Id.
3 Court Trial Minute Entry, at p. 1.
31 Id.
32 Court Trial Minute Entry, at pp. 1-2.
25

°
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Barrett found Haggard guilty of the charge, ordered a Domestic Violence Inventory, and
set sentencing for November 16, 2016. 34
10.

On November 16, 2016, Haggard's counsel appeared without Haggard to

request a continuance of sentencing. 35

Haggard's attorney, Mr. Trevor Castleton,

requested additional time to review the Domestic Violence Inventory. 36 Mr. Castleton's
request was granted and Judge Barret reset the sentencing date to December 7, 2016. 37

Mr. Castleton did not seek a new trial on the basis of Haggard's allegedly invalid jury
trial waiver. 38
11.

On December 7, 2016, both Haggard and his attorney appeared for

sentencing. 39 Mr. Castleton requested a continuance because Haggard's on-going felony
probation would address the Domestic Violence Inventory issues. 40 In addition, the State
sought to review Haggard's felony conviction. 41 Neither Haggard nor his attorney raised
the issue of Haggard's allegedly invalid jury trial waiver. 42

Judge Barrett granted

Haggard another continuance and reset sentencing for December 14, 2016. 43
12.

On December 14, 2016, Haggard and his attorney appeared again in Judge

Barrett's Court for sentencing. 44

Mr. Castleton addressed the Court. 45

Neither Mr.

Castleton nor Haggard raised the issue of Haggard 's allegedly invalid jury trial waiver. 46

33

Id.

34

Court Trial Minute Entry, at p. 2.
November 16 Minute Entry.

35
36
37

Id.

ld.

38

Id.

39

December 7 Minute Entry.

40

Id.
Id.

41

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Sentencing Minute Entry.

45

Id.
Id.

46
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13.

-

Haggard was sentenced to twenty-four months of unsupervised court

probation, to run concurrently with his Bannock County felony probation. 47 He was also
sentenced to ninety days of jail time, with eighty-eight days suspended and held at the
Court's discretion. 48
14.

Haggard did not file a motion for new trial before Judge Barrett.

15.

Haggard appealed his conviction and alleges:

It is reversible error for the conviction to have been entered against
Defendant when he did not waive his right to a jury trial in front of the
presiding magistrate judge as required by applicable Idaho law. 49
IV.
A.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Standard of Review - Appeal from Magistrate Court.

1.

An appeal from a final conviction in a criminal case before the magistrate

court is properly filed in the district court. 50
2.

Generally, a district court reviewing a decision of a magistrate must hear

the matter as an appellate proceeding, unless otherwise the record of the magistrate
proceedings is inadequate. 51
3.

The same standard of review applicable to appeals before the Idaho

Supreme Court applies to a district court when the matter was heard as an appellate
proceeding. 52

ld.; Judgment of Conviction and Order, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416
(filed December 14, 2016) (hereinafter the "Judgment").
48 Judgment, at p. I.
49 Notice of Appeal, State v. Haggard, Bingham County case no. CR-2016-4416 (filed January 20, 2017),
at p. 2, ~ 3a.
50 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(2)(8); Idaho Appellate Rule I l(c)(l).
51 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(f)((l ), (3).
52 Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, I 24 P.2d 993, 995 (2005); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
83(f)(l).
47
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B.

Standard of Review - Fundamental Error.

1.

Generally, issues not raised at the magistrate court level may not be

considered for the first time on appeal. 53 According to the United States Supreme Court,
"[t]his limitation on appellate-court authority serves to induce the timely raising of claims
and objections, which gives the [trial] court the opportunity to consider and resolve
them." 54
2.

Ordinarily, the trial court is in the best position to determine the relevant

facts and to adjudicate the dispute of a party's objection. 55 Mistake or error may thus be
avoided and the ultimate outcome protected. 56 Requiring a contemporaneous objection
also prevents the litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e. "remaining silent about his
objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor." 57
3.

However, every defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process and "[i]t is axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. "' 58 Thus, when an error has not been properly preserved for appeal through
objection at trial, the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly
circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or
her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal. 59

53

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961,976 (2010).
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224,245 P.3d at 976 [citing: Puckett v. US., 556 U.S. 129, 134, 129 S. Ct.
1423, 1428, 173 L.Ed.2d 266, 274 (2009)].

54

ss Id.
56

Id.

571d.
58

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976 [citing: Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Company, Inc.,
556 U.S. 868, 876, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208, 1217 (2009)].
59 State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224,245 P.3d at 976 [citing: State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559,571, 165 P.3d
273, 285 (2007)].
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4.

Notwithstanding the necessity of preserving error below, the Idaho

Supreme Court, in State v. Perry, 60 held that instances of unobjected-to fundamental error
may be subject to review on appeal. 61 Appellate review of unpreserved error is limited to
alleged violations of constitutionally protected rights. 62
5.

Where the defendant presents a question of unpreserved, fundamental

error, the defendant must demonstrate that (a) one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights were violated; (b) the error is clear or obvious, without the need for
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including infom1ation as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and (c) the error affected the
defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings. 63
6.

If the defendant meets his burden under State v. Perry, then an appellate

court must review the error under the harmless error test, with the defendant bearing the
burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of
the trial. 64
C.

Waiver of Jury Trial.

1.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7

of the Idaho Constitution both preserve a criminal defendant's right to trial by jury. 65
2.

Article I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution specifies the manner in which a

trial by jury may be waived by a criminal defendant. It states, in relevant part:

Supra.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d at 978 [citing: State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,251,486 P.2d
260,262 (1971)].
62 State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 [citing: State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625-6, 726
P.2d 735, 737-8 (1986)].
63 State v. Perry, l 50 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
64 Id.
60
61
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The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. . . . A trial by jury may be
waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in
open court .... 66
3.

The method of waiving a jury trial is a procedural matter and is also

governed by rules promulgated by the Idaho Supreme Court. 67 A waiver cannot be made
or enforced unless it appears to have been made in conformance with the existing rule. 68
4.

Idaho Criminal Rule 23(b) addresses the procedure for waiver of a jury

trial in a misdemeanor case. It states:
In criminal cases not amounting to a felony, issues of fact must be tried by
a jury, unless a trial by jury is waived by the consent of both parties
expressed in open court and entered in the minutes. 69
5.

According to the Idaho Court of Appeals, a jury trial waiver may not be

accepted "unless the defendant, after being advised by the court of his right to a trial by
jury, personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in writing or in open court for the
record." 70
6.

Appellate courts carefully scrutinize an assertion that a defendant has

waived his right to ajury. 71 Because trial by jury is one of the fundamental guaranties of
the rights and liberties of the people, every reasonable presumption should be indulged
against its waiver. 72
7.

The consent of the defendant must be express and intelligent. 73

U.S.CONST. AMEND. VI; Idaho Constitution, Art. l, § 7.
Idaho Constitution, Art. I,§ 7.
67 State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, IOI, 753 P.2d 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1988) [citing: Allen Steel Supply
Company v. Bradley, 89 Idaho 29, 403 P.2d 859 (1965)).
68 State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho at IO l, 753 P.2d at 837 (Ct. App. 1988) [citing: Van Vranken v. Fence-Craft,
91 Idaho 742, 430 P.2d 488 ( 1967)].
69 Idaho Criminal Rule 23(b).
70 State v. Swan, I 08 Idaho 963, 966, 703 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1985),
71 State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho at 101, 753 P.2d at 837.
72 Id [citing: Neal v. Drainage District No. 2, 42 Idaho 624, 248 P.22 ( 1926)).
73 State v. Wheeler, I 14 Idaho at IOI, 753 P.2d at 837.
65

66
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8.

"[W]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver

of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case. " 74

V.
A.

ANALYSIS

Haggard Failed to Raise Fundamental Error on Appeal.
Since Haggard did not file a motion for new trial before Judge Barrett or

otherwise raise the issue of a constitutional violation of his right to a jury trial at the
Magistrate Court level, he must demonstrate fundamental error in order to raise the issue
on appeal. 75 To demonstrate fundamental error, Haggard must show that an unwaived
constitutional right was violated; the error is clear or obvious, without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and the error affected Haggard's
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of
the trial proceedings. 76
At the outset, then, Haggard must show that he did not expressly waive his
constitutional right to a trial by jury. The record reflects that Haggard was informed of
his right to a jury trial both in writing 77 and by Judge Barrett in open Court78 on the day
of his arraignment. Haggard initialed the paragraph explaining his right to a jury trial on
the Rights Form, and signed the Rights Form. 79 On the same day, Haggard signed the
Statement of Rights in Domestic Cases, which informed him that, upon a "not guilty"
plea, he could choose whether or not to be tried by jury or by the court. 80 Approximately

Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,278, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (l 942).
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
76 Id.
77 Rights Form, at ,r 4.
78 June 8, 20 l 6 Court Minutes.
79 See: Rights Form.
80 Statement of Rights in Domestic Cases, at p. 1, ,r 1O; and at p. 2.

74

75
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four (4) weeks later, Haggard signed the Pretrial Stipulation and Order, wherein he
chose a court trial over a jury trial and was given the trial date. 81 The Pretrial Stipulation
and Order was filed in the Court's record. 82
The Idaho Court of Appeals' unpublished State v. Vasquez opinion, re-issued on
September 6, 2017, reaffirmed its holding in the 1985 State v. Swan decision, that a jury
trial "waiver may not be accepted 'unless the defendant, after being advised by the court
of his right to a trial by jury, personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in writing
or in open court for the record. "' 83 In Vasquez, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the
charge against her. 84 On the day before trial, Vasquez's attorney and the prosecutor
informed the district court that they intended to waive trial by jury and to proceed to a
Bench trial. 85 Vasquez was never asked by the court whether she personally agreed to
waive her right to a jury trial. 86
Conversely, the record in this case reflects that Haggard was advised by the court
of his right to a jury trial. 87 Haggard personally waived his right to trial by jury in writing
in the Pretrial Stipulation and Order. 88
Haggard argues that most Idaho cases involving attacks upon a jury trial waiver
include an oral waiver on the record. 89 He points to State v. Swan, 90 wherein the Idaho

Pretrial Stipulation and Order.
Id.
83 State v. Vazquez, 2017 WL 3880756, at *2 (Ct. App. September 6, 2017) [citing: State v. Swan, 108
Idaho at 966, 703 P.2d at 730).
84 State v. Vazquez, 2017 WL 3880756, at* 1.
Rs Id.
81

82

86

Id.

Rights Form, at 1 4.
Pretrial Stipulation and Order.
89 Haggard's Brief, at p. 3.
90 Supra.
87

88
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Court of Appeals, quoting American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice,
wrote:
The Court shall not accept a waiver unless the defendant,
after being advised by the court of his right to a trial by
jury, personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in
writing or in open court for the record.
We hold that such procedure is a sound one for Idaho to adopt.
Where the waiver is left to implication from conduct, there is danger of
misinterpretation with respect to a right the im<flortance of which requires
there be certainty. People v. Holmes, supra. 1 A requirement that the
Court personally address the defendant will not constitute an undue burden
on the courts where this very important right is at issue. 92
The key here is the Idaho Court of Appeals' use of the disjunctive "either in
writing or in open court. " 93 The use of the word "or" indicates two alternatives, distinct
from one another. 94 In other words, according to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Haggard
could validly waive his right to a jury trial by one of two methods; in writing or in open
court for the record.
The Notice of Pretrial Conference cites, in its heading, to Idaho Criminal Rule
18.95 Idaho Criminal Rule 18 states, in relevant part:
Informal Conference off the Record. The court may hold the informal
settlement conference off the record. No admissions made by the
defendant or the defendant's attorney at the settlement conference may be
used against the defendant unless the admissions are written and signed by
the defendant and the defendant's attorney or signed by the defendant if
the defendant is self-represented. 96

91

People v. Holmes, 54 Cal.2d 442, 5 Cal.Rptr. 871, 353 P.2d 583 (1960).
State v. Swan, 108 Idaho at 966, 703 P.2d at 730.
93 Id [emphasis added].
94 State v. Hillbroom, 158 Idaho 789, 792, 352 P.3d 999, 1002 (2015).
95 Notice of Pretrial Conference.
96 Idaho Criminal Rule l8(b).
92
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•

Haggard contends he never appeared before the court at the pretrial conference. 97
The record does not reflect how Haggard's pretrial was conducted.

The custom in

Bingham County, as noted by Haggard, 98 is to hold an informal conference between the
prosecutor, the defendant, and defense counsel, after which a pretrial stipulation and
order is signed by the parties and the presiding magistrate judge. If issues arise requiring
the magistrate's presence, the magistrate is called into the courtroom and matters are
placed on the record. While this Court will not assume what, if anything, was placed
upon the record at Haggard' s pretrial conference, the Court takes notice of the procedure
typically utilized at the magistrate court level for pretrial conferences.

Haggard's

Pretrial Stipulation and Order is signed by the prosecutor, defense counsel, and most
importantly, by Haggard. 99 It is not signed by the magistrate judge. 100
Nevertheless, Haggard waived his right to trial by jury in writing on the Pretrial

Stipulation and Order. In addition, the June 8, 2016 Court Minutes from Haggard's
arraignment reflect that Haggard was "advised of his/her rights .... " 101 No transcript has
been provided to this Court to illuminate precisely what sort of colloquy took place
between Judge Barrett and Haggard at Haggard's arraignment.

This Court cannot

presume, one way or another, what Judge Barrett said, or left unsaid, at Haggard's
arraignment. Without a transcript, this Court must rely upon the Court Minutes, which
state that Haggard was advised of his rights in open court.

Haggard's Brief, at p. 4.
Id.
99 Pretrial Stipulation and Order.
lOO Id.
101 June 8, 2016 Court Minutes.
97

98
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Haggard bears the burden of persuasion as to whether fundamental error occurred
at the magistrate court level. 102

Thus the silence of the record with regard to his

arraignment colloquy works to Haggard's detriment, not the State's. 103
Based upon the foregoing, Haggard has not shown that an unwaived constitutional
right was violated at the Magistrate Court level. Instead, the record supports a finding
that Haggard was advised of his right to a jury trial and that he chose to expressly waive
that right in favor of a court trial. Thus, Haggard has not shown fundamental error
subject to review on appeal.
Accordingly, Haggard's appeal shall be dismissed and Judge Barrett's Judgment
shall be affirmed.

VI.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

In light of the foregoing findings, applicable principles of law, and analyses, the
following conclusion is appropriate: Haggard has not demonstrated fundamental error at
the Magistrate Court level.

VII.

ORDER

Accordingly, Haggard's appeal is dismissed and Judge Barrett's Judgment is
affirmed.
11..\

Signed this

11 day of October 2017.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
United States v. Williams, 559 F.3d 607,611 (7 th Cir. 2009) [citing: United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55,
58, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1046, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002); United States v. Griffin, 521 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir.
2008)].
102
103
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